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I.  The Changing Global Context 
Significant changes in the global setting over the course of the last few decades resulted in an 
increasing prominence for the pursuit of transnational justice and individual accountability. The aftermath 
of the terrifying attacks on America on September  
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Synopsis:  The growth in electoral democracies presents many potential opportunities for human 
development. Yet in practice transitional and consolidating democracies often remain fragile and incomplete, 
lacking strong institutions essential for effective voice and accountability, including freedom of expression 
and widespread opportunities for civic engagement. What can be done to strengthen democratic 
development and, in particular what is the role of the media in this process?  
Part I suggests that the mass media will have a positive impact on good governance and human 
development if they function effectively as a watchdog holding the powerful to account and as a civic forum 
facilitating a diversity of voices in public debate. Yet in practice the press is often limited in these roles. 
Liberal theories have long stressed the importance of an independent fourth estate as a check on the abuse 
of power. The study theorizes that this is necessary but not sufficient, in particular media systems strengthen 
good governance and promote positive development outcomes most effectively under two conditions: (i) 
where there is an unfettered and independent free press, and (ii) where there is widespread access to mass 
communications. Part II operationalizes this typology then compares media systems around the world
1. Part 
III examines the cross-national evidence for the impact of these patterns.  
The study confirms that media systems characterized by widespread mass access and by an independent 
press are most closely associated with systematic indicators of good governance and human development. 
In particular, nations with these types of media system experience less corruption, greater administrative 
efficiency, higher political stability, and more effective rule of law, as well as better development outcomes 
such as higher per capita income, greater literacy, less economic inequality, lower infant mortality rates, and 
greater public spending on health. Part IV provides detailed case studies illustrating this relationship in 
particular countries. The conclusion considers the policy implications, suggesting practical steps to 
strengthen the channels of mass communications in poorer societies lacking either widespread access or 
freedom of the press. 
 
Chapter 5: For the UNDP Human Development Report 2002: Voice, Power and 
Accountability for Human Development.  
   3
The growth in electoral democracies presents many potential opportunities for human 
development. The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic expansion in political 
rights and civil liberties worldwide. Since the start of the ‘third wave’ of democratization, in 1974, 
the proportion of states that are electoral democracies has more than doubled, and the number of 
democratic governments in the world has tripled
2. Countries as diverse as the Czech Republic, 
Mexico and South Africa have experienced a radical transformation of their political systems 
through the establishment of more effective party competition, free and fair elections, and a more 
independent and pluralistic press. Many hoped that these developments would expand the voice 
of the disadvantaged and the accountability of governments, so that policymakers would become 
more responsive to human needs, and governments could be removed from power through the 
ballot box if citizens became dissatisfied by their performance.  
Yet in practice, after the initial surge in the early 1990s, many electoral democracies in Latin 
America, Central Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa remain fragile and only poorly consolidated, 
often divided by ethnic conflict and plagued by a faltering economic performance, with excessive 
executive power in the hands of one predominant party and a fragmented opposition
3. The 
central danger, illustrated by the nations of the Andean region, lies in disillusionment with 
democracy, and even occasional reversals
4. Achieving their full democratic potential depends on 
widening and deepening the institutions of voice and accountability, which commonly remain 
deeply flawed.  
The key issues examined here are how channels of mass and interpersonal communications can 
contribute to strengthening voice and accountability and how their role can be made more 
effective. Part I suggests that the mass media will have a positive impact on democratization and 
human development if they function effectively as a watchdog holding the powerful to account 
and as a civic forum facilitating a diversity of voices in public debate. Yet in practice the press is 
often limited in these roles, and in many authoritarian regimes, far from serving the needs of the 
public, the channels of communication reinforce state control and the power of established 
interests. Liberal theories have long stressed the importance of an independent fourth estate as a 
check on the abuse of power. The study theorizes that this is necessary but not sufficient, in 
particular media systems strengthen good governance and promote positive development 
outcomes most effectively under two conditions: (i) where channels of mass communications are 
free and independent of established interests, and in addition (ii) where there is widespread 
diffusion and public access to these media. Both independence and access are required. 
Freedom of the press by itself is insufficient to guarantee development outcomes if poor people 
are excluded from media markets and the information resources provided by newspapers, radios, 
television, and now Internet technologies. Moreover media access is insufficient, if the press is 
subservient to established interests, uncritical of government failures, and fails to hold the 
powerful to account for their actions. Part II uses on this typology to classify and compare media 
systems around the world. Part III examines the cross-national evidence for the impact of these 
patterns. The study confirms that media systems characterized by widespread mass access and 
by an independent free press are most closely associated with systematic indicators of good 
governance and human development. In particular, nations with these types of media system 
experience less corruption, greater administrative efficiency, higher political stability, and more 
effective rule of law, as well as better social outcomes such as higher per capita income, greater 
literacy, lower economic inequality, lower infant mortality rates, and greater public spending on 
health. Part IV provides detailed case studies illustrating this relationship in particular countries. 
The conclusion considers the policy implications, suggesting practical steps to strengthen the 
channels of mass communication in poorer societies by promoting media access and 
independence.   4
I. Theories of the Role of Mass Communications 
What is the role of mass communications in strengthening voice and accountability in good 
governance and human development
5? A long tradition of liberal theorists from Milton through 
Locke and Madison to John Stuart Mill have argued that a free and independent press within 
each nation can play a vital role in the process of democratization by contributing towards the 
right of freedom of expression, thought and conscience, strengthening the responsiveness of 
governments to all citizens, and providing a pluralist platform of political expression for a 
multiplicity of groups
6. Recent years have seen growing recognition that this process is not just 
valuable in itself, but that it is also vital to the human development. This perspective is 
exemplified by Amartya Sen’s argument that political freedoms are linked to improved economic 
development outcomes and good governance in low-income countries, through their intrinsic 
value, their instrumental role in enhancing the voice of poor people, and their impact on 
generating informed choices about economic needs
7. The guarantee of freedom of expression 
and information is regarded as a basic human right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
adopted by the UN in 1948, the European Convention on Human Rights, the American 
Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. In the 
words of the president of the World Bank, James D. Wolfensen, “A free press is not a luxury. A 
free press is at the absolute core of equitable development, because if you cannot enfranchise 
poor people, if they do not have a right to expression, if there is no searchlight on corruption and 
inequitable practices, you cannot build the public consensus needed to bring about change.”
8 
In modern societies, the availability of information is critical to the quality of decision making by 
citizens and policymakers. In economic markets, consumers need accurate and reliable 
information to compare and evaluate products and services. In the political sphere, electors need 
information to judge the record of government and to select among alternative candidates and 
parties. If citizens are poorly informed, if they lack practical knowledge, they may cast ballots that 
fail to reflect their real interests
9. Moreover policymakers need accurate information about 
citizens, to respond to public concerns, to deliver effective services meeting real human needs 
and also, in democracies, to maximize popular electoral support to be returned to office. 
Information in the political marketplace comes from two primary sources. Personal interactions 
commonly include informal face-to-face political conversations with friends, family and 
colleagues, traditional campaign rallies, community forums, and grassroots meetings. These 
information resources remain important, especially for election campaigns in poorer democracies, 
and the growth of email and online discussion groups may revive the importance of personal 
political communications
10. But these channels have been supplemented in modern campaigns 
by the mass media, including the printed press (newspapers and magazines), electronic 
broadcasts (radio and television news), and also more recently the bundle of technologies 
associated with the Internet (including political websites).  The rise of the Internet may be a 
particularly important development for the process of democratization, due to the potential of this 
bundle of technologies for interactive, horizontal linkages breaking down the traditional 
boundaries of space and time, and facilitating oppositional voices, new social movements, and 
transnational advocacy networks, despite the highly uneven distribution of these technologies 
around the globe
11.   
Classical liberal theories suggest that the free press serves to strengthen the process of 
democratization and human development in their ‘watchdog’ role, where the channels of mass 
communications function to promote government transparency and public scrutiny of those in 
authority, highlighting policy failures, maladministration by public officials, corruption in the 
judiciary, and scandals in the corporate sector
12.  Ever since Edmund Burke, the ‘fourth estate’ 
has traditionally been regarded as one of the classic checks and balances in the division of   5
powers
13. Investigative journalism can open the government’s record to external scrutiny and 
critical evaluation, and hold authorities accountable for their actions, whether public sector 
institutions, non-profit organizations, or private companies. Again Internet technologies hold the 
promise to greatly aide public scrutiny. Governments and private actors committed to enhance 
the transparency of their operations, find effective novel tools at their disposal. Vast amounts of 
information can be made available online at relatively low costs, putting public records and 
powerful recherché tools at the fingertips of anyone with Internet access rather than effectively 
hiding them away in archives for resource-rich experts. This viable new dimension of Internet-
mediated transparency would not only strengthen the watchdog capabilities of media outlets, but 
also make it significantly easier for civil society organizations and individuals to scrutinize 
performance and the daily conduct of public affairs. 
[Box A About Here?] 
Equally vital, in their civic forum role, liberal theories argue that the free press can provide a 
public sphere, mediating between citizens and the state, facilitating informed debate about the 
major issues of the day
14. If the channels of communication reflect the social and cultural diversity 
within each society, in a fair and impartial balance, then multiple interests and voices are heard in 
public deliberation. This role is particularly important during political campaigns. Fair access to 
the airwaves by opposition parties, candidates and groups is critical for competitive, free and fair 
elections. It is particularly important that state-owned or public television stations should be open 
to a plurality of political viewpoints and viewpoints during campaigns, without favoring the 
government. This principle has been recognized in jurisprudence from countries as varied as 
Ghana, Sri Lanka, Belize, India, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zambia
15. The Internet could add to 
the diversity of voices, by providing public discussion spaces as well as inexpensive tools for 
publishing information or disseminating it to target audiences. 
[Box B About Here?] 
Early accounts assumed a fairly simple and straightforward relationship between the spread of 
modern forms of mass communications, socioeconomic development, and the process of 
democratization. Modernization theories, offered by Lerner, Lipset, Pye, Cutright and others in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, suggested that the diffusion of mass communications represented 
one sequential step in the development process. In this account, urbanization and the spread of 
literacy lead to growing use of modern technologies such as telephones, newspapers, radios and 
television, and the diffusion of the mass media laid the basis for an informed citizenry able to 
participate in democratic life
16.  Based on simple correlation analysis, showing a strong 
connection between the spread of communications and political development, Daniel Lerner 
theorized: “The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform 
the varied tasks required in the modernizing society. Not until the third stage, when the elaborate 
technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce 
newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This, in turn, accelerates 
the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation (e.g. voting) 
which we find in all advanced modern societies.”
17 Yet in the late 1960s and early 1970s the 
assumption that the modernization process involved a series of sequential steps gradually fell out 
of fashion. Skepticism grew, faced with the complexities of human development evident in 
different parts of the world, major setbacks for democracy with the ‘second reverse wave’ 
experienced in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia
18, and growing recognition that 
control of newspapers and television broadcasting could be used effectively to prop up 
authoritarian regimes and reinforce the power of multinational corporations, as much as to 
advance human rights and provide a voice for the disadvantaged
19.      6
Limits on the Free Press 
Despite liberal ideals, and the potential of media systems for strengthening democracy, in 
practice channels of communication can and often do fail to fulfill these functions, for many 
reasons.  Limitations on the role of the press include explicit attempts at government propaganda, 
official censorship, legal restrictions on freedom of expression and publication like stringent libel 
laws and official secrecy acts, partisan bias in campaign coverage, oligopolies in commercial 
ownership, and more subtle unfairness in the balance of interests and whose voices are 
commonly heard in the public sphere
20. There are multiple examples. 
•  State control of information, particularly via state regulation and ownership of radio and 
television broadcasting, can reinforce ideological hegemony for autocratic regimes, 
limiting social development
21. In Malaysia and Singapore, for example, regimes have 
used the press to stifle internal dissent and forced journalists employed by the 
international press to modify or suppress news stories unflattering to the regime
22.   
•  Governments in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, among others, commonly 
place serious restrictions on press freedom through official regulations, legal restrictions 
and censorship
23. These practices remain more difficult in cyberspace but they are not 
impossible. The control mechanisms range from banning ownership of modems 
(Myanmar) or blocking access to websites (Vietnam), to monitoring of email traffic and 
discussion groups (China), and policing domestic online content. While highly skilled 
Internet users can circumvent some of these measures, they work quite effectively for the 
average Internet user.  
•  During elections, pro-government bias on television and radio has failed to provide a level 
playing field for all parties in many countries, exemplified by recent campaigns in Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine and Mozambique
24.  
•  Statistics collected by media freedom organizations show that each year dozens of media 
professionals are killed or injured in the course of their work. In many parts of the world, 
journalists face the daily threat of personal danger from wars, internal conflict, coups, 
terrorism and vendettas
25. In Colombia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zimbabwe and Egypt 
many journalists, broadcasters and editors have experienced intimidation, harassment 
and imprisonment by the police and military. 
•  Media coverage of complex emergencies and ethnic conflict is a particular concern. For 
example, leaders in Yugoslavia used the state-controlled media to accentuate ethnic 
divisions and fuel hatred against other groups via TV and radio broadcast brimming with 
shallow cultural stereotypes and one-sided reports about the atrocities committed by the 
other side.
26 The role of radio propaganda in fueling the conflict between Tutsi and Hutu 
in Rwanda is equally well documented.
27 
•  Some express concern about concentration of ownership in the hands of major 
multinational corporations with multimedia empires around the globe. Well-known 
examples include AOL Time Warner and the Walt Disney Corporation in the United 
States, News International in Australia, Bertelsmann in Germany, Thomson in Canada, 
and Fininvest in Italy
28. It is feared that media mergers may have concentrated excessive 
control in the hands of a few multinational corporations, which remain unaccountable to 
the public, reducing media pluralism
29.  
•  Some emerging trends may exacerbate the global digital divide. The global gap in 
Internet access and skills is aggravated by the accelerating cycle of technological   7
upgrading. Rising computing power goes hand in hand with ever more complex software 
tools and resource hungry multimedia applications. Rapid obsolescence of ICT 
equipment makes it even more difficult for users in developing countries to keep up with 
the advancing online communication standards.  
Therefore despite the liberal ideals of the free press, in practice far from strengthening the voice 
of marginalized and disadvantaged groups, and strengthening government accountability to 
citizens, the mass media may serve to reinforce the control of powerful interests and governing 
authorities. The long-term danger is that electoral democracies experience ineffective governance 
and growing disillusionment with representative institutions, hindering the process of 
democratization and human development, while communication channels may strengthen the 
control of governing parties and established elites in non-democratic states.  
Problems of Voice and Accountability   
The role of the free press as a channel of voice and accountability has become even more 
important in recent decades. Electoral democracies face serious challenges in deepening and 
widening avenues for expression and participation in the policymaking process. Limits on media 
pluralism in non-democratic states deny a platform for dissent, criticism and mobilization for 
groups and parties opposing the governing regime. The spread of electoral democracies, and 
rising levels of education in medium and low-income societies, have expanded the potential 
opportunities for political participation. During the post-war era, levels of electoral turnout have 
risen steadily and substantially in many Latin American and Asian nations, even though there is 
evidence of a fall during the 1990s in postindustrial states
30. Yet there is widespread concern that 
much of the public remains disengaged from many of the more demanding forms of civic activism 
beyond voting. It is feared that any erosion in participation will affect the marginalized sectors of 
society who are least involved in public life, including the poor, ethnic minorities, women, and the 
younger generation. Growing political inequality can affect whose voices are commonly heard, 
and whose voices are commonly silenced, in the public sphere. Observers point to a litany of civic 
ills suggesting that many traditional forms of political activities that were once common in older 
democracies have become less popular today.  Studies of conventional political participation and 
civic engagement in established democracies provide evidence of eroding party membership and 
weakening partisan loyalties
31. The shrinkage of manufacturing industry in developed economies 
has reduced the number of blue-collar workers who can join trade unions
32, just as secularization 
has emptied church pews
33. The bonds of belonging to the plethora of traditional community 
associations, civic groups, and voluntary organizations appear more frayed and tattered than in 
the past
34. Although there continues to be conflicting evidence, many also believe that there is a 
rising tide of public cynicism about government and public affairs
35.  If fewer disadvantaged and 
minority groups are engaged in public debate, this may reinforce existing social inequalities in the 
decision-making process, and government responsiveness to claims for human development. 
Problems of electoral accountability have also increased. In traditional theories of representative 
democracy, citizens within the nation-state hold elected representatives and governments to 
account directly through the mechanism of regular elections, and indirectly in intra-electoral 
periods via the news media, parties, interest groups, NGOs and social movements in civil society. 
Accountability is essentially a relationship of responsibilities between agencies, and there are 
many types, such as from private companies to stockholders and employees, from physicians to 
professional medical bodies, from non-profit foundations to their boards, and from workers to 
managers. Government accountability rests on three underlying conditions:    8
•  Transparency of decision-making in the policy process, including explicit rules and 
agreed procedures specifying who has authority and responsibility over what spheres of 
government decision-making;  
•  Institutional mechanisms for holding public officials responsible for their decisions and 
actions, including  
o The  administrative accountability of the civil service, government departments 
and public sector agencies to Cabinet ministers;  
o The  legal accountability of the executive and legislature to the courts; and  
o The  electoral accountability of parliaments and elected heads of State to citizens; 
and,  
•  Suitable sanctions to enforce accountability, such as a vote of confidence in parliament, 
legal penalties by the courts, or removal from office by the electorate.   
Within the government, parliaments function as the main forum for public scrutiny of ministers and 
departments, while the courts serve as the primary mechanism for legal redress. Elections 
provide the public with a direct voice in this process, allowing citizens to ‘throw the rascals out’ at 
regular intervals if dissatisfied by their performance. The news media are a central intermediary 
and lubricant in this process through their function as watchdog over the public interest, providing 
information that can then be acted upon by parliaments, the legal system, or the electorate. If all 
these mechanisms fail, then government accountability suffers and there can be abuses of the 
public purse and major administrative inefficiencies without recourse, such as failure to deliver 
basic human services like clean water, schools and local health clinics. Failures of accountability 
are exacerbated if media pluralism is restricted, if the policymaking process is opaque and 
secretive, if the mechanisms of responsibility break down because decisions are the joint product 
of complex negotiations and shared responsibilities between multiple overlapping agencies, and if 
sanctions are weak or non-existent.  
Channels of political accountability have become more complex in recent decades due to a series 
of interrelated developments. 
•  Direct electoral accountability operates almost exclusively at the level of the nation state, 
yet the autonomy of the nation-state has eroded, with power flowing simultaneously 
upwards to international agencies through the forces of globalization, outwards to non-
profit and private agencies, and downwards with moves towards devolution and 
decentralization
36.  
•  Globalization has increased the influence of international agencies and transnational 
organizations, like the World Trade Organization and the World Bank, where citizens 
have only an indirect voice, exercised through national delegates
37.  
•  The growth of transnational policy networks provides an alternative channel of influence 
for many NGOs, groups and social movements in a global public sphere, but this process 
bypasses the formal channels of electoral and administrative accountability within 
representative government
38.  
•  The ‘shrinkage of the state’ through initiatives such as privatization, marketization and de-
regulation mean that decision-making has flowed away from public bodies and official 
government agencies that were directly accountable to elected representatives,   9
dispersing to a complex variety of non-profit and private agencies operating at local, 
national and international levels
39.  
•  The fragmentation of decision-making and policymaking bodies can widen the pluralistic 
range of entry-points for groups seeking to influence the policy process, but at the same 
time it can foster autonomous and fragmented ‘iron triangles’ (also described as ‘policy 
subsystems’, ‘sub-governments’ or ‘closed networks’) in different policy sectors linking 
technical specialists, administrators and political entrepreneurs, making it difficult to 
establish authoritative and coherent programs in government
40.  
For all these reasons, it has become more difficult for citizens to use elections channels of 
accountability as a way of removing policymakers in power, reinforcing the need for alternative 
mechanisms to protect the public interest, including the role of an unfettered and independent 
press. 
II: Comparing Media Systems 
Therefore liberal theories have long stressed the importance of an independent journalism as a 
check on the abuse of power. The study theorizes that this is necessary but not sufficient, in 
particular media systems strengthen good governance and promote positive development 
outcomes most effectively under two conditions:  
•  In societies where channels of mass communications are free and independent of 
established interests; and in addition  
•  Where there is widespread public access to these media.  
The reason is that freedom of the press by itself is insufficient to guarantee positive development 
outcomes if disadvantaged groups and marginalized communities are excluded from the 
information resources provided by the mass media. For example, the potential impact of the 
Internet on democracy and social progress will continue to be limited if there is no closure of the 
digital divide, and if online political resources, as well as access to basic information about jobs, 
educational opportunities, news, and social networks, are unavailable to many poorer populations 
in large swathes of Sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia and Latin America
41. Yet access to 
communications is insufficient by itself, if the printed press remain subservient to established 
interests, if television news fails to report government policy failures, if radio broadcasters are 
unable to hold the powerful to account for their actions, and if there are relatively few websites 
reflecting the concerns of local groups and minority languages in poorer societies. For 
communication channels to function effectively in accordance with the hopes of liberal theory we 
can theorize that access and independence are required (see Figure 1).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Levels of access influence the scope and reach of mediated channels of communication, how 
widely politicians can reach the public through the press, as well as how far citizens can use 
these channels to learn about public affairs. The wider the level of access to news from daily 
papers, radio, television and the Internet then, ceteris paribus, the greater the potential for media 
impact.  Access to the mass communications most commonly includes the printed press 
(newspapers and magazines), the traditional electronic broadcast media (radio and television), 
and the new technologies associated with the Internet (including email and the World Wide Web). 
Media access can be measured by World Development Indicators monitoring the circulation of 
daily newspapers, and the distribution of radio receivers and television sets per 1000 population 
in 135 nations, the proportion of the population online population and the weighted distribution of 
Internet hosts (see Table A1)
42.  These indicators of media diffusion are strongly inter-related (all   10
correlations are strong and significant (R=0.55 and above Sig.01), although there are some 
societies which rely more heavily than average upon the printed press, such as South Korea, 
Norway, Romania and Israel, while other countries are more reliant upon television in patterns of 
media use, such as the United States, Portugal and El Salvador (see Appendix Figure 1). Given 
the strong correlations, access to all mass media were combined into a single scale, standardized 
to 100-points, including the per capita circulation of daily newspapers, the availability of radio 
receivers and television sets, and the proportion of the population that used the Internet and the 
distribution of Internet hosts.  As the scale was heavily skewed towards richer nations, using a 
logged scale normalized the distribution. 
Press freedom can be expected to influence whether the impact of the news media promotes 
pluralistic voice and government accountability, or how far it serves to reinforce the power of 
established interests and state control. Press freedom is far more complex and difficult to assess 
in any comprehensive fashion but the annual Freedom House Press Freedom Survey (2000) can 
be used as the standard cross-national indicator. Press Freedom is measured by how much the 
diversity of news content is influenced by the structure of the news industry, legal and 
administrative decisions, the degree of political influence or control, the economic influences 
exerted by the government or private entrepreneurs, and actual incidents violating press 
autonomy, including censorship, harassment and physical threats to journalists. The assessment 
of press freedom distinguishes between the broadcast and print media, and the resulting ratings 
are expressed as a 100-point scale for each country under comparison. Evaluations of press 
freedom in 186 nations were available in the 2000 Freedom House survey.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
The Map of Media Systems 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of 135 nations across these dimensions. The scatter of societies 
in the top-right hand corner shows that in many older democracies, as well as some newer 
democracies such as the Czech Republic, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, Jamaica, and 
Venezuela, liberal patterns of press freedom are strongly related to widespread media access. 
Some of these societies are among the most affluent around the globe, yet only moderate levels 
of human development characterize others such as South Africa, El Salvador, and Poland.  In 
contrast, in societies located in the top left-hand corner of the map, exemplified by Singapore, 
Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Russia, there is relatively widespread access to most modern 
forms of mass media like television and yet limited freedom of the press, suggesting the greatest 
potential for domestic news channels to be used by government, official agencies and established 
interests as an agency of partisan bias, or even state propaganda, with a scope which reaches 
large sectors of the population
43.  
Media systems in countries like India, Botswana, Namibia and the Philippines, located in the 
bottom right-hand corner of the scatter plot, are characterized by a flourishing independent press 
and yet limited public access to newspapers, television, and the Internet, due to problems of 
literacy and poverty. In these countries, the media can be expected to have a positive impact on 
pluralism and government accountability, especially through competition among elites in civil 
society, but to exert only limited influence on the general population because of its limited reach. 
Lastly, most low-income nations are scattered in the bottom left-hand corner, such as Angola, 
Rwanda, Cambodia and Bangladesh, where there are major restrictions on the freedom of the 
press as a force capable of challenging government authorities, and yet the role of the media is 
also limited as a channel of state propaganda because of restricted levels of mass access to 
newspapers, television and the Internet.   In these nations, traditional forms of campaign 
communication such as local rallies, posters and community meetings, and grassroots party   11
organizations, are likely to be more important in mobilizing political support than mediated 
channels. 
III. The Impact of Media Systems on Human Development 
What is the impact of this pattern on good governance and human development?  Recent years 
have seen growing attempts to gauge and measure systematic, valid and reliable indicators of 
political development and the quality of democracy in a wide range of countries worldwide. We 
can draw on a recent study for the World Bank
44 that developed subjective perceptions of 
indicators of good governance, drawing on multiple surveys of experts, that assessed four 
dimensions based on the criteria of political stability, the rule of law, government efficiency and 
levels of corruption (see the Technical Appendix for details). Political stability is important as this 
reflects the regular rotation of government office, consolidation of the ‘rules of the game’, 
continuity in constitutional practices, and lack of political violence due to acts of terrorism. The 
rule of law concerns the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary and courts, perceptions 
of violent or non-violent crime, and the enforceability of contracts. Government efficiency is 
gauged by perceptions of the quality of the public service and the independence of the civic 
service from political pressures. Lastly perceptions of corruption reflect the success of a society in 
developing fair, transparent and predictable rules for social and economic interactions. Subjective 
judgments may prove unreliable for several reasons, including reliance upon a small number of 
national ‘experts’, the use of business leaders and academic scholars as the basis of the 
judgments, variations in country coverage by different indices, and possible bias towards more 
favorable evaluations of countries with good economic outcomes. Nevertheless in the absence of 
other reliable indicators covering a wide range of nations, such as surveys of public opinion, 
these measures provide one of the best available gauges of good governance
45. If widespread 
access to the free press plays an important role in promoting government accountability, then this 
should be evident in these indicators. Table 1 shows the simple correlations between these 
indicators without any controls. The results confirm that the indicators of media access, press 
freedom and the combined communications index were all strongly and significantly related to 
good governance. Countries much of the public has access to the free press have the greater 
political stability, rule of law, government efficiency in the policy process, and least corruption.   
[Table 1 about here] 
Liberal theories claim that in addition to promoting a more efficient public policy process, by 
publicizing social problems and articulating public concerns mass communications also function 
to make the authorities more responsive to basic human needs.  Table 2 examines the 
correlations between the communication measures and several common indicators of human 
development. The results confirm that press freedom, access to the mass media, and the 
combined Communication Index are all strongly related to positive development outcomes, 
measured by the Human Development Index, income, economic equality, lower infant mortality, 
longer life expectancy, higher spending on public health, and greater adult literacy. These 
coefficients need to be interpreted with caution, as no controls are included, and the causal 
interpretation of these relationships is not unambiguous
46. In particular it could well be argued that 
greater levels of economic prosperity produced by development generate the underlying 
conditions for the purchase of household consumer durables like televisions, radios, and personal 
computers. The expansion of the middle class service sector in more developed economies is 
associated with greater affluence and growing leisure time, which are both strongly linked to use 
of the mass media. Use of newspapers and the Internet, in particular, require cognitive skills and 
knowledge that are strongly related to levels of education and literacy. Nevertheless, despite a 
process of interaction, the consistent and strong relationship across all the different indicators of 
human development and good governance is striking.    12
[Tables 2, 3 and 4 about here] 
The relationship between the typology of media systems and these indicators are illustrated in 
Tables 3 and 4. The results confirm that the 52 societies with widespread access to the free press 
consistently scored far higher than all other media systems across all the indicators of good 
governance and human development: people living in these nations have more stable political 
systems, more efficient government processes and less corruption, as well as living longer, with 
greater affluence, and more economic equality. In sharp contrast, countries lacking an 
independent press and public access to mass communications scored consistently worst across 
all these indicators.  Media matters, both for its own sake, and for development. 
VI: Case Studies of the Role of Communications in Human Development 
While vibrant media sectors and broad access generally go in hand with good governance, the 
relation between media development and the democratic quality of the polity is not fixed or 
inevitable. Media can evolve into a driver for greater openness even in an adverse political 
environment. The case of Ghana illustrates these issues. 
[Box on Ghana about here] 
Political will and a commitment to openness can make the media flourish even in the face of 
extreme poverty.  Mali is a prime example. 
[Box on Mali about here] 
Both Mali and Ghana underscore the importance of radio for reaching illiterate groups. Both 
countries however, face persistent problems in expanding access. The urban-rural divide is of 
particular concern. Radio receivers are concentrated in urban areas. In Mali, only 54 in 1000 
people own radio receivers and 95% of all receivers are concentrated in urban area, where only 
26% of the population lives. 
Funding is also a preeminent problem for rural stations. They often rely upon donor support or 
voluntary community input, since they cannot attract sufficient lucrative advertising like their urban 
counterparts that cater to more affluent audiences. Certain legislative provisions are also still 
hampering press freedom and repressive practices in both countries. Closure of radio stations or 
intimidation of journalists still occurs. Nevertheless, political organizations have helped institute 
independent journalism, such as the Union of Free Radio and Television in Mali or Women in 
Broadcasting in Ghana, and the Government of Mali has in the recent past taken further steps 
towards a conducive regulatory environment and liberalized libel laws. 
In contrast, India adopted a different strategy to develop its media sector focusing on public 
broadcast TV as the prime medium to reach the rural population. 
[Box on India about here] 
Achievements in TV ownership in India appear moderate at first sight.  Yet the access rates are 
quite remarkable considering low-income levels and the collective viewing arrangements that are 
not reflected in the basic numbers. Yet the diversity of programming available in rural areas 
remains limited. In addition, the state retains a monopoly on AM radio and has only very recently 
allowed private FM radio stations for entertainment but not political programming, foreclosing 
opportunities to increase plurality through private sector and community initiatives in this area. 
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As these case studies indicate, both commercial and public programming face considerable 
challenges in catering to remote areas and disadvantaged groups. Audiovisual programming is 
costly, while poorer groups make it difficult to attract sufficient advertising for a viable business 
model. The commercial broadcast sector therefore has the greatest incentive to target the urban 
middle classes. Scarce public resources limit how far public sector broadcasters can afford to 
produce content in local languages. Cable networks are mainly limited to urban areas. Rural 
Internet connectivity is also low. Compounding these problems, illiteracy rates among the rural 
poor often limit the reach of the print media. Also newspapers and magazines are often 
unaffordable for low-income groups: the high costs for imported newsprint in East Africa, for 
example, means that the price of one magazine exceeds the average daily income of urban 
workers, not to mention that of the rural population.
47 
Intermediate technologies can go some way to fill these gaps for marginalized groups. 
Community radio, for example, has been a staple in South America, Africa and Asia for decades. 
Relative to other media it requires only moderate up-front investments, both for operators and the 
audience. It can reach illiterate groups, carry local programming, and has low operating costs, 
making sustainability feasible.
 Moreover, collective ownership of radio stations can provide strong 
accountability to the community.
48 
[Box on intermediate technologies about here] 
But community radio is not without its shortcomings. For one, it can fall prey to local rather than 
national elites, and replicate similar patterns of biased accountability and influence on the 
community level. Another problem is that community radio can create communication enclaves, 
articulating minority voices, but disconnected from the wider public. Under favorable conditions, 
with a co-operative local administration, community media can greatly enhance local governance. 
But where concerns touch on national policies, voices need to travel upstream. Community media 
can facilitate the first steps in this process, the formation of informed opinions, the aggregation of 
voices, and their transmission into concrete political claims. To make these voices heard more 
widely, community radio needs links with channels of mass communication.   
[Box Audiovisual Community Media about here] 
Conclusions: Strengthening Channels of Voice and Accountability 
The lessons from this analysis suggest that strengthening the channels of communication is vital 
for voice and accountability, particularly for electoral democracies that are in the process of 
establishing more effective political and economic institutions. However, enabling equitable and 
inclusive access to information and channels of communication is a complex task. Different media 
exhibit different shortcomings that require committed action in a wide range of policy fields. The 
required activities fall under three interrelated categories: 
•  A rights-based policy framework that protects and promotes the fundamental freedoms of 
expression, association and information; 
•  Affirmative policies in the area of education, media competence, and access to media 
that help disenfranchised groups to utilize these freedoms; and, 
•  Statutory and regulatory provisions for a thriving media and communications sector. 
A rights-based policy framework 
Freedom of expression, association and information are the fundamental building blocs of voice 
and accountability. Being highly interrelated, they need to be addressed simultaneously. Freedom 
of expression, in order to be effective, requires freedom of association, the possibility to bundle   14
voices, mobilize and organize and thus turn individual grievance into vocal collective claims. At 
the same time, freedom of information, the right to transparent conduct of public affairs and 
access to information of public interest is a precondition for forming opinions and developing 
political engagement. As our examples have shown, these freedoms are under threat in many 
countries. Contrary to early optimistic hopes, novel information and communication technologies 
do not provide a magic bullet to circumvent these problems. In specific instances the Internet can 
weaken certain constraints, giving opportunities to strengthen voice and accountability, provided 
basic freedoms of expression, association, and information are in place. 
The emergence of the Internet makes advocacy for these rights not less but even more urgent. 
Freedom of information, the right to access and inspect public records held by the state and other 
institutions of public interest, is one example. Making official information easily accessible in the 
public realm has become considerably cheaper and more effective with the rise of the Internet. 
This information need not be confined to policy outputs and thus ex-post accountability. Putting 
proceedings and minutes of meetings online opens transparency for the decision-finding process 
and helps the public fine-tune the attribution of responsibility for specific actions. Posting draft 
proposals on the Internet and soliciting comments online provides new avenues to get heard. It 
can make consultative processes, which are often confined to semi-public policy networks, more 
transparent and inclusive 
All these opportunities however, depend on the information practices of governments and Internet 
access by the general public. The basic principles of freedom of information have been enshrined 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Incorporating the right of access to information into 
national legislation is not a luxury preserve for rich countries. South Africa for example has drawn 
up ambitious provisions for freedom of information.  
[Box on South Africa about here] 
Many other countries, including a large number of industrialized ones, have so far failed to enact 
effective legislation with statutory recognition of freedom of information, wide application to all 
entities of the state, only limited exceptions for reasons of security and privacy, and speedy 
provision of requested information at low costs.
49 
The demand for transparency has been voiced on many levels. In India a right to information 
campaign by the Association for the Empowerment of Workers and Farmers has successfully 
demanded the release of public accounts. Expenditures are scrutinized in a public audits with the 
participation of the local community, often revealing considerable levels of misappropriation at the 
expense of the poor.
50 
The Internet can also help apply pressure. Consider a recent example from international regime 
formation. In 1999 and 2000 negotiations towards the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas 
(FTAA) were mostly held behind closed doors. No drafts were made available for wider public 
consultation. In late 1999 an NGO coalition launched a “liberate the text” campaign to prompt the 
release of draft material for public scrutiny. Over 300 groups posted the petition on their websites, 
which received a favorable echo in the media, further embarrassing the participating governments 
over their non-transparent conduct. Eventually in April 2001 a leaked draft of the controversial 
investment chapter appeared on an NGO website and under increasing public pressure the entire 
official draft document was eventually made public in July 2001.
51 
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International organizations committed to openness and promotion of the Internet as a tool for 
political empowerment is uniquely positioned to lead and showcase a new culture of 
transparency. Yet they also often fail to deliver.  
[Report card on International organizations about here] 
Affirmative policies for media competence and access 
The guarantees for basic freedoms are insufficient by themselves. Media skills and access to 
communication channels are unequally distributed. Limited access is a function of poverty and 
education, but also language, gender, age, the urban-rural divide, and specific disenfranchised 
groups such as ethnic minorities. On the skill side, insufficient literacy and keyboard skills are 
some of the most pressing issues, although radio or TV can help overcome some of these 
problems. It helps if Internet content is relevant to local needs, such as information about jobs, 
education, and health, which means developing local skills in the creation and editing of 
community websites and developing servers as hosts. 
On the access side, infrastructure policies need to consider the plight of under-served areas and 
user groups. While the liberalization of telecommunication markets promises significant overall 
cost savings, the commercial incentives to provide service to remote, sparsely populated areas 
and user groups with moderate purchasing power are often insufficient. Public policy provisions 
can help. Licenses for telecommunications operators can include specific obligations to extend 
service into commercially less viable segments and regions. These universal service provisions 
are well-established instruments of telecommunication policies, applied in industrialized and 
developing countries alike, and fully consistent with international obligations under the WTO.
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Collective access can also help.  Telecenters and Internet cafes, which provide a range of 
telecommunication services to an entire village, can provide a feasible alternative, funded by 
public, non-profit, or commercial services. Cheap mobile telephones and hand-held units are 
popular for text-messaging services. The creative combination of communication technologies 
can also help widen access to advanced communication technologies. In Sri Lanka for example, 
Radio Kothamale offers people the opportunity to phone in requests for information searches on 
the Internet.  
Provisions for an independent, accountable, and inclusive media sector 
What specific policy measures can best achieve accountability, independence and plurality in the 
media? Provisions for public service radio and television broadcasting include: 
•  A statutory funding mechanism, such as license fees, that does not depend on the 
general budget and thus cannot be easily exploited as mechanism for political 
interference. License fees can even serve as lever for direct popular accountability as 
several popular fee boycotts in South Korea have shown.
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•  An organizational structure that minimizes political appointments and institutionalizes 
internal plurality and balance through representation of a wide spectrum of social and 
political interest in bodies such as advisory committees or supervisory boards, thereby 
enhancing procedural accountability. 
•  A clear legal mandate that enshrines editorial independence and a democratic public 
service mission creating formal legal accountabilities. 
•  Institutionalized channels for public feedback, such as a complaints board. 
In commercial broadcasting, plurality and democratic accountability can be strengthened through:   16
•  Competition for broadcasting licenses. 
•  Quotas for minority stations in the allocation of scarce frequencies. 
•  Requirements for commercial operators to carry minority programming. 
•  Caps on concentration in ownership: this can take many forms such as limits on 
ownership of different media in one market, or limits on the overall ownership of a 
particular medium in the domestic market. 
•  Public subsidies and state support for minority media, such as specific print media 
(Sweden) or for community radio (Mexico). 
•  Advertising rules that require a clear separation between advertisement and editorial 
content. 
•  Transparency and disclosure provisions for media companies with regard to ownership 
structures (France) or revenue sources.  
•  Training of media professionals: this ranges from fundamental journalistic tasks to 
general management skills, and can also include a strong component on quality 
standards and professional ethics 
•  Donor support for independent media projects. 
Yet content related provisions are a double-edged sword. They might be intended to safeguard 
specific public standards, but at the same time they can provide an inroad for political 
interference. Quality assurance might be better served through the promotion of self-regulatory 
efforts, such as codes of conduct and media councils that encourage peer-based scrutiny, instill 
accountability, and also provide channels for public complaints. Instituting a carefully crafted right-
of-reply that minimizes interference with editorial freedom can also support fair reporting.  
At the same time journalistic freedom and investigative journalism require protection from 
excessive liabilities for libel and defamation and a right to protect sources. 
Additional Internet provisions 
Maximizing the efficacy of the Internet for political empowerment also rests on a number of 
specific public policy provisions.   
Limit the liability of Internet service provider for content 
Making Internet service provider overly responsible for the content that customers send through 
their networks can have adverse effects, creating strong incentives to proactively police websites 
and remove controversial content that might provoke lawsuits. This can stifle open 
communication and the establishment of dissenting political websites. Classifying Internet service 
provider as conduits rather than content providers help limit these liabilities and remove 
incentives for censorship. 
Grant equal rights for online journalists 
Emerging media outlets on the Internet often do not enjoy the full rights and protections of 
established journalists. In Malaysia for example, journalists from the major online newspaper 
Malaysiakini have repeatedly been denied entry to official functions and press conferences.
54 Fair 
treatment of online journalism facilitates the evolution of this segment and promotes diversity and 
competition in the media sector.   17
Safeguard basic visibility online 
Being online does not mean being visible. While resource-rich agents will always find it easier to 
buy space on prominent portal websites, a number of policy principles could help ensure more 
equal visibility for everyone. Walled garden business models are on the rise. In these schemes 
Internet service and content providers increasingly seek to keep users within the confines of their 
websites by reducing links to external sources and presenting their associates contents most 
prominently. Recent estimates, for example, indicate that US Internet users spend 60% of their 
online time with the content and products of only 14 conglomerates.
55 Explicit contractual 
obligations in online partnerships to limit links to external websites should be discouraged. 
Similarly, the workings of search engines, the pivotal navigation tools on the World Wide Web, 
raise doubts about non-discrimination and inclusiveness. Critics complain that paid-for placement 
is insufficiently distinguishable from other search results, while the specific criteria and methods 
used by search engines and directory services are rarely transparent.
56 Mandating more 
transparency and a clearer distinction between paid and unpaid content could help avoid some of 
the major distortions in online visibility. 
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Notes: Measures of media access and press freedom. See technical appendix for details.   19
 
Figure 2: Types of Media Systems 
Press Freedom (Freedom House 2000)
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Political Stability/Violence  R .633 .633 .727
   Sig.  .000 .000 .000
   N 140 119 120
 
Rule of Law  R .644 .682 .763
   Sig.  .000 .000 .000
   N 151 124 125
 
Government Efficiency  R .688 .649 .771
   Sig.  .000 .000 .000
   N 141 120 121
 
Corruption R .674 .652 .788
   Sig.  .000 .000 .000
   N 140 119 120
Notes: See technical appendix for details. 
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Human Development Index 1999 UNDP  R .519 .879 .801
   Sig. .000 .000 .000
   N 167 127 128
 
Income (Per Capita GDP in PPP US$ 1997)  R .508 .752 .793
   Sig. .000 .000 .000
   N 167 127 128
 
Economic Equality (Reversed Gini Index)   R .246 .401 .403
   Sig. .009 .000 .000
   N 113 101 101
 
Lower Infant Mortality  R .405 .813 .670
 Sig. .000 .000 .000
 N 142 129 130
 
Public expenditure on health (% of GDP)   R .475 .604 .659
   Sig. .000 .000 .000
   N 140 127 128
 
Life Expectancy (yrs) UNDP 1999  R .464 .803 .700
   Sig. .000 .000 .000
   N 168 127 128
 
Adult literacy rate % 1997 UNDP  R .404 .776 .673
   Sig. .000 .000 .000
   N 167 127 128
 
% With secondary education 1999 UNDP  R .459 .766 .731
   Sig. .000 .000 .000
   N 125 100 101
Notes: See technical appendix for details. 
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Table 3: Mean scores on good governance indicators by type of media system 
  
Type of Media System  N.  Political 
Stability
Rule of Law  Government 
Efficiency
  Corruption
Limited access to non-free press  59 -.65 -.63 -.65 -.60
Limited access to free press 22 -.28 -.16 -.22 -.34
Wide access to non-free press  17 -.09 .02 -.11 -.22
Wide access to free press  53 .74 .80 .73 .80
 Notes: See technical appendix for details. 
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Table 4: Mean scores on human development indicators by type of media system 
  
Type of Media 
System 


















on health % 
of GDP 








Limited access to 
non-free press 
68 .560 3208 42.1 67.5 2.1 66.3 52.2
Limited access to 
free press 
31 .619 3621 47.0 64.6 2.9 71.0 53.1
Wide access to 
non-free press 
17 .759 7919 40.2 16.2 4.1 89.3 70.3
Wide access to 
free press 
52 .843 14278 34.8 11.7 4.8 95.7 83.2
Total 167 .678 7183 39.7 42.1 3.4 78.5 65.6
 Notes: See technical appendix for details.   24


















ADD BOXED CASE DEVELOPING THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLES…? 
•  In India, the Defense Minister, George Fernandes, was forced to resign in March 
2001 as the most senior victim of the bribery scandal that footage implicating 
senior officials in corrupt arms deals.  
•  In Turkey, in September 2001 the Minister for Housing and Public Works, Koray 
Ardin, resigned after newspapers ran a series of allegations of corruption in the 
allocation of public works contracts for disaster relief.  
•  In an even more famous case, Peruvian cable television broadcast videos of
bribery in vote buying, secretly video taped by the head of security, Vladimiro 
Montesinos, which led to the immediate resignation of President Alberto Fujimoro.
•  In Germany, the role of the free press can be illustrated in terms of the Kohl 
election fund scandal.   
ADD BOXED CASES ILLUSTRATING PROBLEMS OF ELECTORAL BALANCE/BIAS? 
•  Pro-government bias in Belarus media in the presidential election documented by the 
OSCE; 
•  Cambodian elections: The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, Abid Husse, reporting the principles that should operate in the 1999 
Cambodian elections
1: 
•  There should not be bias or discrimination in media coverage;  
•  Censorship of election programs should not be allowed;  
•  Media should be exempt from legal liability for provocative statements and a right of 
reply should be provided;  
•  There should be a clear distinction between news coverage of functions of 
government office and functions as a party candidate;  
•  Air time for direct access programs should be granted on a fair and non-discriminatory 
basis;  
•  Programs should provide an opportunity for candidates to debate each other and for 
journalists to question them;  
•  Media should engage in voter education;  
•  Programs should target traditionally disadvantaged groups, which may include women 
and ethnic and religious minorities.     25




Mali has embarked on a promising process of democratization in 1991 with the ouster of long-term 
dictator Moussa Traoré and the shift to multi-party democracy. A nascent cluster of alternative 
media such as the newspaper Les Echos created in 1998 and the radio station Radio Bamakan
have contributed to this process and successfully challenged the information monopoly of the old 
regime. 
Institutionalizing media rights 
Reforming media policies has been an integral part of the political transformation. The freedom of 
the press was instituted in 1991 by the then transitional government. While this stimulated the media 
sector in general it proved particularly fertile for the radio sector, triggering the emergence of several 
other independent radio stations. In a country with literacy rates of only 30% and almost 60% of 
people living below the poverty line, radio has evolved into the most inclusive and vibrant medium.  
Towards a dynamic radio sector 
The signing of the Bamako Declaration on Radio Pluralism by the new Mali president in 1993 further 
bolstered the sector and encouraged NGOs, rural association and other social groups to become 
involved. Mali even became the first African country with an all-women radio station. Today the 
media sphere in Mali boasts 40 independent newspapers and 60 radio stations. Importantly access 
to media for the 80% of the population living in rural areas has considerably increased. By 2000 
77% of Mali citizens are within the reach of at least one community radio station, up from 64% two 
years earlier. While the state monopoly mainly broadcast in French, a language not spoken by the 
majority of the population, programming is now available in many local languages further 
augmenting accessibility. Education on political rights and civil liberties is an important component in 
programming and observers note the strong commitment of the radio community to the 
democratization process. Audience surveys identify the radio as predominant information source. 
For example 76% of mean and 50% of women regard the radio as main source for information on 
HIV/Aids. 
High-level support for new technologies 
With the help of bilateral donors the Internet has made its debut in Mali in 1997. Enabling domestic 
measures for Internet development have included the establishment of a high-level directorate for 
information technologies within the Prime Minister’s Office, the opening of the Internet service 
provider market to private competition and the reduction of customs duties for computer equipment. 
By 2001 eight Internet service providers have take up business. A training academy for network 
professionals has been established with the help of a US equipment manufacturer. 
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Box: Democratization and Media in Ghana
58 
 
From 1981 to 2000 Ghana has lived under the repressive regime of Jerry Rawlings. While political 
party competition was introduced in the early 1990s. However, Rawlings maintained an iron grip on 
the state controlled media, which helped him secure victory in the 1996 elections.  
Despite manifold repressions, a nascent independent media sector gradually emerged and began to 
undermine the information monopoly of the state. Especially independent radio broadcasting 
developed in a dynamic way. Taking the lead was a university with early broadcasting experiments 
quickly followed by what was then an ‘illegal’ private radio station. The government finally responded 
to mounting pressure for access to the media sector with a carefully crafted licensing framework which 
restricted eligibility to Ghanaian citizens and corporations, prohibited the ownership of both a TV and 
radio station and sought to guarantee a non-discriminatory selection process. Political parties and 
religious organizations were prohibited from owning a station, but could appear as guests in talk 
shows. 
By 1998 more than 45 FM applicants had been authorized. Far from relegating the audience to a 
passive role, the new stations include call-in shows into their regular schedules. These interactive 
shows turned out to be very popular. They provide a rather informal setting for the discussion of daily 
affairs and concerns. Callers need not speak English but are encouraged to use the vernacular they 
feel most familiar with. September 27, 2000 underscored impressively the vitality of the new sector.
 An 
open debate among presidential candidates was broadcast live on TV and radio at the eve of the 
general elections. Six out of seven candidates attended the debate. Question were filed by 
experienced journalists as well as a wide range of social groups, including students, unionists and 
women activists. Finally in the December 2000 elections Ghana made history when the ruling party 
was voted out of office after a more than 20 year long grip on power. 
 These successes notwithstanding, Ghana faces persistent challenges to extend radio services to 
rural areas and the poor. Many FM stations can only be received within urban areas and cater to the 
higher income urban middle class. Moreover, the poorest users are still excluded from this novel 
public discussion space since they cannot afford the phone call to participate in the call- in programs. 
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Starting as early as in the mid-40s with stations run for peasants and miners in remote areas in Latin 
America community radio has played a major role in strengthening the voices and communication 
channels in communities around the world. Today thousands broadcast all over the world, their exact 
numbers difficult to estimate, since many operate without license. Ownership structures vary. Not for 
profit stations, collectively owned or run by public interest groups are quite common in Latin America 
whereas private commercially oriented stations are predominant in West Africa. Programming typically 
evolves from music attuned to the local taste to providing a forum for announcements and dedications 
and eventually, with growing expertise and audience, to health, education and general news 
coverage. Thus community radio can help nurture local cultures, support social ties and 
communication networks as well as provide access to information relevant to daily affairs. The 
versatility of community radios can be put to use in many ways. Examples: 
 
Crises management and peace-building 
Radio Kwizera (Hope) is a donor funded radio project for the refugee camps at the Burundi/Rwandan 
border. Established to foster peace, reconciliation and public education its programme ranges from 
refugee-tracing services and health education (e.g. HIV awareness via soap operas) to greetings and 
music. Audience surveys have confirmed the popularity of  Radio Kwizera and a performance 
evaluation has recommended to extend this model to other refugee camps. 
 
Voice for rural populations 
Radio Izcanal (El Salvador) was started by peasant refugees returning to their democratizing 
homeland and aims to provide a voice for the rural population in the Usulutan region. The station is 
community owned and provides for extensive participation through local recruitment, community 
interviews or the relay of greeting messages. Funding comes from donors and through advertising 
revenue. Radio Izcanal is part of an community radio umbrella organization that has bought a FM 
frequency, which is made available to all participating stations.  
 
Despite the promises of community radio, public funding is quite rare. Mexico is a notable exception. It 
supports indigenous community radio in more than 30 local languages catering to more than six 
million indigenous communities.    29










In early 2001 South Africa has passed a Promotion of Access to Information Act, which codifies 
access to information held by the government. In what can be considered a very forward-looking 
approach, the act also expands access rights also to information held by private third parties such as 
credit bureaus and medical institutions (full text of legislation available on the SA government website: 
http://www.gov.za/gazette/acts/2000/a2-00.pdf). 
Community TV broadcasts have proven less successful than radio, since production costs are 
considerably higher. Independent video productions however, remain an important medium for 
disenfranchised groups. The production process itself provides for a dialogue to reflect on community 
identity and problems. The output is a case for recognition and often a channel for political claims.  
Early projects addressed agricultural training and peasant organization in countries like Peru, Mexico 
or Mali. In India Video Sewa, a group of women from varied background, many of them illiterate, have 
produced videos on many aspects of their lives. Manek Chowk, a documentary on female roadside 
vendors and their problems with policy harassment was successfully utilized in a campaign to issue 
licenses and grant legal protection. 
The road to larger audiences can take many forms. Some documentaries by Video Sewa have found 
their way into TV broadcasts. TV Viva and TV Maxambomba, two video projects in Brazil for example 
work with video shows on big screens in streets and places. 
Technological advances have significantly lowered production costs and the Internet holds out to 
further enhance production and distribution. However, funding often constitutes a major problem for 
video initiatives. Many are donor supported. And as with community radio the linkages to channels of 
mass communication are erratic at best.   30
Technical Appendix: 
Variable  Definition and source 
MEDIA ACCESS   
Newspapers  Daily newspaper circulation (published at least 4 times a week) per 1000 
people (1996) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1999 
TV  Sets  Television sets in use per 1000 people, 1999. International 
Telecommunications Union World Telecommunications Indicators Database 
2000. 
Radio  Receivers  Radio receivers in use per 1000 people, 1997. International 
Telecommunications Union World Telecommunications Indicators Database 
2000. 
Online Users  The percentage of online users in the adult population derived from national 
surveys asking respondents whether they use email or the world wide web. 
The figures represent the latest survey available in fall 2000. www.NUA.ie.  
Hosts  Computers with active Internet Protocol (IP) addresses connected to the 
Internet, per 100 people, July 2000, www.Netcraft.com. Hosts without a 
country code identification were weighted and relocated. See Pippa Norris. 
2001. Digital Divide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Press Freedom Scale  Diversity of news content is measured in the 2000 Freedom House annual 
survey of Press Freedom according to the structure of the news industry, 
legal and administrative decisions, the degree of political influence or control, 
the economic influences exerted by the government or private entrepreneurs, 
and actual incidents violating press autonomy, including censorship, 
harassment and physical threats to journalists. The 100-point scale combines 
the broadcasting and newspaper scores and the scale is reversed so that a 
higher score represents greater press freedom. www.FreedomHouse.org 
Media Access  A summary logged standardized scale of the proportion of newspapers, TV 
Sets, Radio Receivers, Online Users and Internet Hosts.  






Human Development  The Human Development Index (1998) is based on longevity, as measured 
by life expectancy at birth; educational achievement; and standard of living, 
as measured by per capita GDP (PPP $US). UNDP Human Development 
Report 2000.  
Per  Capita  GDP  Measured in $US in Purchasing Power Parity, 1998. UNDP Human 
Development Report 2000. 
Economic Equality  The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income within 
an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The index has been 
reversed so that 1 represents perfect equality. World Development Indicators   31
2001 World Bank. 
Lower Infant Mortality  The number of infants dying before the age of one year, per 1000 live births, 
1999. The indicator has been reversed so that a higher figure represents 
lower infant mortality. World Development Indicators 2001 World Bank 
Public health 
expenditure  
Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from 
government budgets, external borrowings and grants as a percentage of 
GDP, 1997-99. World Development Indicators 2001 World Bank. 
Life  expectancy  Life expectancy at birth (years) 1995-2000. UNDP Human Development 
Report 2000. 
Adult  literacy  rate  Literacy as a percentage of adults (15 and above) 1998. UNDP Human 
Development Report 2000. 
% Secondary education  Secondary age group enrolment as a percentage of the relevant age group, 




Political  stability  An aggregated measure of political stability and violence based on expert 
assessments Daniel Kaufman, Aaart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. 
‘Governance Matters.’ World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196, Washington 
DC. 
Rule of Law  An aggregated measure of rule of law based on expert assessments Daniel 
Kaufman, Aaart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. ‘Governance Matters.’ 
World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196, Washington DC. 
Government  efficiency  An aggregated measure of government efficiency based on expert 
assessments Daniel Kaufman, Aaart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. 
‘Governance Matters.’ World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196, Washington 
DC. 
Corruption  An aggregated measure of corruption based on expert assessments Daniel 
Kaufman, Aaart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. ‘Governance Matters.’ 
World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196, Washington DC. 
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Table A1: Measures of Press Freedom, Media Access and the Communication Index                                                     
 
     

























1 Afghanistan 10 . . . . . .
2 Albania 44 36 217 113 .0 7 37.8
3 Algeria 17 38 241 107 .0 8 15.1
4 Angola 20 11 54 15 .1 2 4.1
5  Antigua and Barbuda 54 . . . 4.3 . .
6 Argentina 59 123 681 293 1.0 22 79.4
7 Armenia 43 23 224 238 .1 9 41.7
8 Australia 90 293 1376 706 37.4 55 156.5
9 Austria 88 296 753 516 5.5 33 133.7
10 Azerbaijan 30 27 23 254 .0 6 23.5
11 Bahrain 25 . . . 5.4 . .
12 Bangladesh 40 9 50 7 .0 1 4.6
13 Barbados 84 . . . 1.9 . .
14 Belarus 20 174 296 322 .1 16 23.9
15 Belgium 91 160 793 523 19.8 34 139.2
16 Belize 75 . . . 4.3 . .
17 Benin 70 2 108 11 .1 2 26.9
18 Bhutan 24 . . . . . .
19 Bolivia 78 55 675 118 .1 17 95.9
20  Bosnia & Herzegovina 44 152 248 112 .0 9 41.6
21 Botswana 72 27 156 20 .2 4 44.3
22 Brazil 67 40 444 333 4.1 17 82.2
23 Brunei 26 . . . 3.1 . .
24 Bulgaria 70 257 543 408 1.8 24 97.0
25 Burkina  Faso 60 1 33 11 .0 1 -3.8
26 Burundi 17 3 71 15 .0 2 3.3
27 Cambodia 39 2 127 9 .0 5 27.4
28 Cameroon 23 7 163 34 .0 4 14.0
29 Canada 86 159 1077 715 41.9 49 145.0
30 Cape  Verde 68 . . . .0 . .  33

























31  Central African Rep. 40 2 83 6 .0 2 10.2
32 Chad 28 0 242 1 .0 5 19.2
33 Chile 73 98 354 240 1.0 14 83.5
34 China 20 . 333 292 .7 . .
35 Colombia 41 46 581 199 .9 17 50.5
36 Comoros 60 . . . .1 . .
37  Congo, Dem. Rep. 23 8 375 2 .1 10 23.4
38 Costa  Rica 84 94 271 229 .8 15 99.4
39 Cote  D'Ivoire 26 17 164 70 .04 5 18.2
40 Croatia 37 115 336 279 2.22 15 43.5
41 Cuba 6 118 353 246 .22 14 6.9
42 Cyprus 84 . . . 4.35 . .
43 Czech  Republic 80 254 803 487 2.83 31 119.2
44 Denmark 91 309 1141 621 20.75 46 151.4
45 Djibouti 37 . . . .15 . .
46 Dominica 84 . . . .31 . .
47 Dominican  Republic 70 52 178 96 .24 7 57.2
48 Ecuador 56 70 419 205 .04 16 66.9
49 Egypt 31 40 324 183 .62 10 30.8
50 El  Salvador 60 48 464 191 .50 24 82.6
51 Equatorial  Guinea 22 . . . .01 . .
52 Eritrea 32 . 91 16 .03 . .
53 Estonia 80 174 693 555 10.86 30 117.6
54 Ethiopia 38 1 195 6 .01 4 23.0
55 Fiji 42 . . . .63 . .
56 Finland 85 455 1496 643 28.04 60 151.1
57 France 76 218 937 623 10.60 38 119.6
58 Gabon 45 29 183 251 .27 5 32.9
59 Gambia 30 2 169 3 .04 4 16.3
60 Georgia 53 . 555 474 .09 . .
61 Germany 87 311 948 580 14.97 40 139.6
62 Ghana 39 13 238 115 .08 7 33.0
63 Greece 70 153 477 480 1.05 22 94.3
64 Grenada 80 . . . 2.00 . .  34

























65 Guatemala 46 33 79 61 .46 5 31.6
66 Guinea-Bissau 44 5 44 . .04 . .
67 Guinea 29 . 47 44 .22 . .
68 Haiti 42 3 55 5 .03 1 4.3
69 Hondurus 52 55 386 95 .27 11 53.5
70 Hungary 70 186 689 448 4.96 27 100.7
71 Iceland 88 . . . 40.36 . .
72 India 58 . 121 75 .08 . .
73 Indonesia 51 24 156 143 .04 6 40.9
74 Iran 32 28 265 157 .15 9 30.6
75 Iraq 2 19 229 83 . . .
76 Ireland 79 150 699 406 12.00 28 114.0
77 Israel 70 290 520 328 10.17 25 97.5
78 Italy 73 104 878 488 15.68 33 110.6
79 Jamaica 89 62 480 189 1.97 15 104.4
80 Japan 81 578 955 719 15.48 48 136.4
81 Jordon 43 58 287 83 .82 8 39.1
82 Kazakhstan 32 . 384 238 .12 . .
83 Kenya 30 9 104 22 .16 3 13.0
84 Kiribati 83 . . . .38 . .
85  Korea, Republic Of 73 393 1033 361 21.88 40 116.9
86 Kuwait 52 374 660 480 3.69 31 77.6
87 Kyrgyzstan 39 15 112 57 .05 3 21.0
88 Laos 34 4 143 10 . . .
89 Latvia 76 247 710 741 4.07 30 112.2
90 Lebanon 39 107 906 351 4.26 28 56.5
91 Lesotho 44 8 49 16 .03 2 9.5
92 Liberia 33 . . . .01 . .
93  Libya Arab Jamahiriy 10 14 233 136 . . .
94 Lithuania 80 93 513 420 2.16 22 107.1
95 Luxembourg 90 . . . 11.90 . .
96 Macedonia 58 21 200 250 1.00 10 57.1
97 Madagascar 68 5 192 22 .03 4 43.5
98 Malawi 48 3 249 3 .06 5 33.9  35

























99 Malaysia 30 158 420 174 2.86 15 35.7
100 Maldives 35 . . . .54 . .
101 Mali 74 1 54 12 .01 1 9.5
102 Malta 83 . . . 5.26 . .
103 Marshall  Islands 92 . . . . . .
104 Mauritania 33 0 151 96 .01 5 22.6
105 Mauritius 83 75 368 230 3.55 14 95.4
106 Mexico 50 97 325 267 .95 14 57.2
107 Micronesia,  Fed  Stat 76 . . . .91 . .
108 Moldova 42 60 740 297 .08 22 56.3
109 Mongolia 71 27 151 61 .05 5 48.6
110 Morocco 51 26 241 165 .45 9 47.7
111 Mozambique 52 3 40 5 .07 1 -.6
112 Myanmar 01 09 5 7 . . .0
113 Namibia 66 19 144 38 .56 4 40.7
114 Nepal 41 11 38 7 .06 1 1.9
115 Netherlands 86 306 978 600 24.36 42 139.9
116 New  Zealand 92 216 990 518 14.77 39 146.0
117 Nicaragua 60 30 285 69 .34 10 60.4
118 Niger 38 0 69 27 .01 2 10.8
119 Nigeria 47 24 223 68 .01 6 37.4
120 Norway 95 588 915 648 41.59 52 162.8
121 Oman 29 29 598 575 1.74 25 40.4
122 Pakistan 36 23 98 119 .04 4 22.4
123  Panama Canal Zone 70 62 299 192 1.08 11 73.4
124 Papua  New  Guinea 72 15 97 13 .00 3 31.3
125 Paraguay 49 43 182 205 .02 7 39.9
126 Peru 33 84 273 147 .08 10 33.1
127 Philippines 70 79 159 110 .45 7 59.2
128 Poland 81 113 523 387 5.17 22 108.9
129 Portugal 83 75 304 560 2.02 19 106.2
130 Quatar 38 . . . 4.58 . .
131 Romania 56 300 319 312 .67 17 69.2
132 Russian  Federation 40 105 418 421 3.66 20 51.7  36

























133 Rwanda 28 0 102 0 .01 2 8.7
134 Saint  Lucia 87 . . . 1.33 . .
135  Sao Tome & Principe 73 . . . .29 . .
136 Saudi  Arabia 10 57 321 263 .58 13 11.1
137 Senegal 67 5 142 41 .09 4 38.7
138 Seychelles 50 . . . 3.00 . .
139 Sierra  Leone 15 4 253 13 .01 5 11.0
140 Singapore 34 360 822 308 14.71 34 52.2
141 Slovakia 70 185 580 417 9.44 25 98.2
142 Slovenia 73 199 406 356 23.00 24 100.8
143 Solomon  Islands 82 . . . .48 . .
144 Somalia 12 . . . . . .
145 South  Africa 75 32 317 129 4.18 10 76.0
146 Spain 82 100 333 547 7.85 21 107.7
147 Sri  Lanka 30 29 209 102 .08 7 24.6
148  St. Kitts & Nevis 82 . . . 3.75 . .
149  St. Vincent & 
Grenadine
84 . . . 1.82 . .
150 Sudan 15 27 271 173 .00 8 13.3
151 Suriname 69 . . . 1.64 . .
152 Swaziland 23 . . . .30 . .
153 Sweden 89 445 932 531 44.38 48 149.9
154 Switzerland 92 337 1000 518 16.44 42 148.9
155  Syrian Arab Republic 27 20 278 66 .07 7 23.4
156 Taiwan 79 . . . 21.84 . .
157 Tajikstan 6 20 142 328 . . .
158 Tanzania 51 4 279 21 .02 6 40.0
159 Thailand 70 63 232 289 .22 11 72.0
160 Togo 26 4 218 22 .12 5 17.8
161  Trinidad & Tobago 72 123 534 337 1.56 20 93.9
162 Tunisia 26 31 223 190 .52 9 25.0
163 Turkey 42 111 180 332 .95 12 45.0
164 Turkmenistan 14 . 276 201 . . .
165 Uganda 60 2 128 28 .05 3 29.9  37

























166 Ukraine 40 54 884 413 .29 29 58.3
167  United Arab Emirates 24 156 345 252 8.88 18 30.0
168 United  Kingdom 80 329 1436 652 23.90 54 138.4
169 United  States 87 215 2146 844 39.11 73 161.9
170 Uruguay 71 293 607 531 2.73 24 97.4
171 Uzbekistan 17 3 465 276 .04 15 19.9
172 Vanuatu 56 . . . .06 . .
173 Venezuela 66 206 468 185 .35 17 81.6
174 Viet  Nam 25 4 107 184 .02 3 12.5
175 Western  Samoa 66 . . . .24 . .
176 Yemen 32 15 64 286 .04 2 10.8
177 Yugoslavia 19 107 297 273 .94 13 21.5
178 Zambia 38 12 121 145 .10 5 27.9
179 Zimbabwe 33 19 93 180 .27 3 15.2
Total 179 179 136 143 142 169 130 131
 
Notes: See technical appendix for details. 
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Appendix Figure 1: Correlations between access to newspapers and television 
TV sets per 1000 1997 World Bank
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